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Context: Access control is among the most important security mechanisms, and XACML is the de facto
standard for specifying, storing and deploying access control policies. Since it is critical that enforced pol-
icies are correct, policy testing must be performed in an effective way to identify potential security ﬂaws
and bugs. In practice, exhaustive testing is impossible due to budget constraints. Therefore the tests need
to be prioritized so that resources are focused on their most relevant subset.
Objective: This paper tackles the issue of access control test prioritization. It proposes a new approach for
access control test prioritization that relies on similarity.
Method: The approach has been applied to several policies and the results have been compared to ran-
dom prioritization (as a baseline). To assess the different prioritization criteria, we use mutation analysis
and compute the mutation scores reached by each criterion. This helps assessing the rate of fault detec-
tion.
Results: The empirical results indicate that our proposed approach is effective and its rate of fault detec-
tion is higher than that of random prioritization.
Conclusion: We conclude that prioritization of access control test cases can be usefully based on similar-
ity criteria.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Modern networked systems must be equipped with security
services that provide adequate protection to users and companies
in a relatively open environment. Several approaches and infra-
structures, e.g., [1,2] have been recently proposed for the delivery
of adaptive dynamic services that can provide seamless connectiv-
ity while preserving privacy and conﬁdentiality of personal and
critical data.
Security is achieved through appropriate mechanisms that
guarantee the conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability (the
so-called CIA triad) of on-line data. Among security mechanisms,
one important component is the access control system, which medi-
ates all requests of access to protected data. Access control ensures
that only the intended, i.e., authorized users can access the data,
and that these intended users are only given the level of accessrequired to accomplish their tasks. In short, the access control sys-
tem replies to an authorization request with a permit/deny deci-
sion that is typically based on predeﬁned security policies. Any
fault in the access control system could lead to security ﬂaws,
resulting in either denial of accesses that should be allowed, or,
even worse, allowance of accesses to non authorized users. Thus,
it is important to perform a careful veriﬁcation and validation of
such system.
XACML [3] is the de facto standard for specifying, storing and
deploying access control policies. However, the process of XACML
policy speciﬁcation can be error-prone due to the language com-
plexity. Several approaches have been proposed to automate the
generation of XACML tests, including Targen [4] and X-CREATE
[5]. A common drawback of existing tools is that they produce a
huge number of tests. For evident limitations of testing budget
and time, it is generally impossible to run all those tests and check
that the results are correct (this latter step is usually done manu-
ally). Therefore means to identify, among the many generated
tests, those ones that deserve higher priority are crucial. This paper
focuses on this speciﬁc issue, namely, on XACML test prioritization.
Test prioritization has been widely investigated in the ﬁeld
of software testing: it aims at deﬁning a test execution order
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that those tests that have a higher priority are executed before
the ones having a lower priority. Several proposals include
approaches for test prioritization in the context of regression test-
ing [6,7]. We clarify that in this paper we do not address prioritiza-
tion techniques expressly for regression testing; more in general
we aim at deriving a test execution order for a given test suite.
In [8], several test prioritization techniques are used to increase
the fault detection rate of test suites. More recent results [9] still
conﬁrm the effectiveness of test case prioritization based on fault
detection rate and show the ﬂexibility of the approach for applica-
tion in different contexts. However, as demonstrated in [10], no
prioritization metric is the best one for any system: indeed, the
performance of the prioritization approach varies according to
the considered application and could depend on the evaluated test
suites. Another proposal addresses time-constrained test prioriti-
zation in the context of integer programming [11].
An approach that is currently considered very promising is
based on the notion of test similarity, e.g., [12]: the intuition
behind similarity-based prioritization is that when resources are
limited and only a subset of test cases within a large test suite
can be executed, then it is convenient to start from those that
are the most dissimilar according to a predeﬁned distance function.
In this paper, we propose to adapt similarity-based prioritization
to order XACML test cases. To do this, we need to capture and specify
what is a suitable notion of distance between XACML requests.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the ﬁrst attempt
to introduce a prioritization strategy in XACML access control
systems. The approach has been implemented into a tool called
SIMTAC (SIMilarity Testing for Access-Control) that is publicly
available for download.1
To evaluate the proposed prioritization strategy for the testing
of XACML access control systems, we consider the fault detection
rate criterion. In particular, we rely on mutation analysis to inject
faults into the XACML policy, and challenge the ordered tests to
detect the faults seeded in the policy itself. The goal is to end up
with XACML tests ordered in a way that enables to quickly reach
a high mutation score.
The contributions of this paper include:
 the introduction of the ﬁrst test prioritization technique for
XACML access control systems;
 the deﬁnition of two XACML similarity metrics, a simple one
independent of the XACML policy, and another exploiting the
XACML policy speciﬁcation;
 an empirical study that compares different alternative tech-
niques to prioritize XACML requests (on six policies of various
complexity) for assessing our proposed technique.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the XACML language and how XACML test cases are
generated. Section 3 motivates this work while Section 4 presents
our new test similarity-based prioritization approach. Then, Sec-
tion 5 shows the empirical evaluation of the proposed approach,
followed by Section 6 that discusses threats to validity. Finally,
Section 7 presents the related work and Section 8 concludes the
paper, also hinting at future work.
2. Background
This section introduces the background behind the proposed
approach. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst present the XACML language and
an XACML policy example. Then we focus on XACML requests gen-
eration and provide a short description of a combinatorial testing1 A release of the SIMTAC tool is available at http://labse.isti.cnr.it/tools/simtac.strategy used for deriving the test suites adopted in the empirical
validation.
2.1. XACML language
XACML [3] is a de facto standardized speciﬁcation language that
deﬁnes access control policies and access control decision
requests/responses in an XML format. An XACML policy deﬁnes
the access control requirements of a protected system. An access
control request aims at accessing a protected resource in a given
system whose access is regulated by a security policy. The request
is evaluated against the policy and the access is granted or denied.
The main components of an access control systems architecture
are the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision
Point (PDP). A PEP intercepts a user’s request, transforms it into
an XACML format and transmits it to the PDP. As showed in
Fig. 1, the PDP evaluates the request against the XACML policy
and returns the access response (Permit/Deny/NotApplicable/
Indeterminate).
In a simpliﬁed vision an XACML policy has a hierarchical struc-
ture: at the top level there is the policy set, which can contain in
turn one (or more) policy set(s) or policy elements. A policy set (a
policy) consists of a target, a set of rules and a rule combining algo-
rithm. The target speciﬁes the subjects, resources, actions and
environments on which a policy can be applied. If a request satis-
ﬁes the target of the policy set (policy), then the set of rules of the
policy set (policy) is checked, else the policy set (policy) is skipped.
A rule is composed by: a target, which speciﬁes the constraints
of the request that are applicable to the rule; a condition, which
is a boolean function evaluated when the request is applicable to
the rule. If the condition is evaluated to true, the result of the rule
evaluation is the rule effect (Permit or Deny), otherwise a NotAppli-
cable result is given. If an error occurs during the application of a
request to the policy, Indeterminate is returned. The rule combining
algorithm speciﬁes the approach to be adopted to compute the
decision result of a policy when more than one rule may be appli-
cable to a given request. For instance, the permit-overrides algo-
rithm speciﬁes that Permit takes the precedence regardless of the
result of evaluating any of the other rules in the combination, then
it returns Permit if there is a rule that is evaluated to Permit, other-
wise it returns Deny if there is at least a rule that is evaluated to
Deny and all other rules are evaluated to NotApplicable. If there
is an error in the evaluation of a rule with Permit effect and the
other policy rules with Permit effect are not applicable, the
Indeterminate result is given. The access decision is given by
considering all attribute and element values describing the sub-
ject, resource, action and environment of an access request and
comparing them with the attribute and element values of the
policy.
Listing 1 illustrates an XACML policy with two rules. The ﬁrst
rule (lines 33–67) states that a student can borrow and return
books from the library. The second rule (lines 68–96) states that
a professor is authorized to buy books for the library.Fig. 1. XACML policy evaluation.
1 <Pol i cySet xmlns=”xacml:2 . 0 : p o l i c y : s c h ema : o s ”
2 xmlns :x s i=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema−i n s tance ”
3 PolicyCombiningAlgId=” f i r s t −app l i c ab l e ” Po l i cySe t Id=”LibrarySet ”>
4 < !−− THE POLICY SET TARGET −−>
5
6 <Target>
7 <Resources>
8 <Resource>
9 <ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
10 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Book</Attr ibuteValue>
11 <ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” resource−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
12 </ResourceMatch>
13 </Resource>
14 </Resources>
15 </Target>
16 <Pol i cy Po l i cy Id=”Library ” RuleCombiningAlgId=” f i r s t −app l i c ab l e ”>
17
18 < !−− THE POLICY TARGET −−>
19
20 <Target>
21 <Subjec t s>
22 <Subject>
23 <SubjectMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
24 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Student</Attr ibuteValue>
25 <Subjec tAtt r ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” subject−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
26 </SubjectMatch>
27 </ Subject>
28 </ Subjec t s>
29 </Target>
30
31 < !−− THE POLICY RULES −−>
32
33 <Rule E f f e c t=”Permit” RuleId=”Rule1”>
34
35 < !−− RULE 1 TARGET: SUBJECTS, RESOURCES AND ACTIONS −−>
36
37 <Target>
38 <Subjec t s> <Subject>
39 <SubjectMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
40 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Student</Attr ibuteValue>
41 <Subjec tAtt r ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” subject−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
42 </SubjectMatch>
43 </ Subject>
44 </ Subjec t s>
45 <Resources><Resource>
46 <ResourceMatch
47 MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
48 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Book</Attr ibuteValue>
49 <ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” resource−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
50 </ResourceMatch>
51 </Resource>
52 </Resources>
53 <Actions><Action>
54 <ActionMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
55 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Borrow</Attr ibuteValue>
56 <Act ionAttr ibuteDes ignator Attr ibute Id=” act ion−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
57 </ActionMatch>
58 </Action>
59 <Action>
60 <ActionMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
61 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Return</Attr ibuteValue>
62 <Act ionAttr ibuteDes ignator Attr ibute Id=” act ion−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
63 </ActionMatch>
64 </Action>
65 </Actions>
66 </Target>
67 </Rule>
68 <Rule E f f e c t=”Permit” RuleId=”Rule2”>
69
70 < !−− RULE 2 TARGET: SUBJECTS, RESOURCES AND ACTIONS −−>
71
72 <Target>
73 <Subjec t s><Subject>
74 <SubjectMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
75 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Pro f e s s o r</Attr ibuteValue>
76 <Subjec tAtt r ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” subject−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
77 </SubjectMatch>
78 </ Subject>
79 </ Subjec t s>
80 <Resources><Resource>
81 <ResourceMatch
82 MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
83 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Book</Attr ibuteValue>
84 <ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” resource−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
85 </ResourceMatch>
86 </Resource>
87 </Resources>
88 <Actions> <Action>
89 <ActionMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
90 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>Buy</Attr ibuteValue>
91 <Act ionAttr ibuteDes ignator Attr ibute Id=” act ion−id ” DataType=” s t r i n g ”/>
92 </ActionMatch>
93 </Action>
94 </Actions>
95 </Target>
96 </Rule>
97 </ Po l i cy>
98 </ Po l i cySet>
Listing 1. XACML policy example.
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1 <?xml ve r s i on=” 1 .0 ” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
2 <Request>
3 <Subject>
4 <Attr ibute Att r ibute Id=” subject−id ” DataType=”XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>
5 <Attr ibuteValue>Student</Attr ibuteValue>
6 </Attr ibute>
7 </ Subject>
8 <Resource>
9 <Attr ibute Att r ibute Id=” resource−id ”
=epyTataD01 ”XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>
11 <Attr ibuteValue>Book</Attr ibuteValue>
12 </Attr ibute>
13 </Resource>
14 <Action>
15 <Attr ibute Att r ibute Id=” act ion−id ”
=epyTataD61 ”XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>
17 <Attr ibuteValue>Borrow</Attr ibuteValue>
18 </Attr ibute>
19 </Action>
20 <Environment/>
21 </Request>
Listing 2. XACML request example.
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resource, an action and an environment. The values and types of
these four elements should be among the values and types deﬁned
by the policy rules or targets. Testing an XACML policy involves
generating a set of requests to be evaluated based on the policy.
The responses to these requests are then checked against the
expected decisions. The next section presents a strategy for auto-
matically generating the XACML requests.
2.2. Test cases generation
A critical issue in testing XACML access control systems is the
generation of an effective test suite.
Listing 2 presents an example of an XACML request of a student
asking to borrow a book from the library. In detail the request con-
tains one subject attribute (Student), one action attribute (Borrow)
and one resource attribute (Book). If this request is evaluated con-
sidering the XACML policy of Listing 1, a Permit decision is returned
allowing the access. Speciﬁcally, this request will be ﬁrst evaluated
against the target of the policy set (line 6–15): it will be applicable
to this target since it matches the resource Book; then it will be
evaluated against the target of the policy (line 20–29): it will be
applicable to this target since it matches the subject Student;
ﬁnally it will be evaluated against the rules Rule1 (line 33–67)
and Rule2 (line 68–96): it will be applicable to Rule1 since it
matches the subject Student, the resource Book and one of the
two actions speciﬁed in that rule (the Borrow action), whereas it
will be not applicable to the rule Rule2 since it does not match
the subject and action of this rule. Because the deﬁned algorithm
in the policy is ﬁrst-applicable, the effect of the ﬁrst rule, i.e., Permit
will be returned.
Several common approaches for generating XACML requests are
based on combinatorial strategies, as surveyed in Section 7. In this
paper, among the tools available for test cases generation we refer
to X-CREATE [13,5,14].2 In particular, we use the Simple Combinato-
rial test strategy implemented in this tool for deriving the test suites
used to empirically validate the effectiveness of the proposed XACML
prioritization approach.
The Simple Combinatorial strategy applies a combinatorial
approach to the policy values. Speciﬁcally, four data sets called
SubjectSet, ResourceSet, ActionSet and EnvironmentSet are deﬁned.
These sets are ﬁlled with the values and the attributes of the policy
elements hSubjectsi, hResourcesi, hActionsi and hEnviron-
mentsi, respectively. The elements and attributes values in each
set are then combined in order to obtain the entities. Speciﬁcally,2 A release of the X-CREATE tool is available from http://labse.isti.cnr.it/tools/
xcreate.a subject entity is deﬁned as a combination of the values of ele-
ments and attributes of the SubjectSet set. Similarly the resource
entity, the action entity and the environment entity represent com-
binations of the values of the elements and attributes of the
ResourceSet, ActionSet, and EnvironmentSet respectively.
Then, an ordered set of combinations of subject entities, resource
entities, action entities and environment entities is generated in the
following way:
 First, pair-wise combinations are generated to obtain the PW
set.
 Then, three-wise combinations are generated to obtain the TW
set.
 Finally, four-wise combinations are generated to obtain the FW
set.
These sets have the following inclusion propriety PW# TW#
FW . Thus, the maximum number of requests derived by this
strategy is equal to the cardinality of the FW set. The X-CREATE
framework provides an ordered set of requests guaranteeing a
coverage ﬁrst of all pairs, then of all triples and ﬁnally of all
quadruples of values entities derived by the policy. Since the
Simple Combinatorial strategy relies only on the values entities
speciﬁed in the policy, the derived test suite can be used for test-
ing either the policy or the PDP. More details about this strategy
are in [5].3. Motivation
It is a shared understanding in testing environments that auto-
mated support tools for test cases generation and execution can
drastically reduce the huge time and effort usually required for
these activities. However, the activity of checking the testing out-
comes remains largely a manual task and can become the bottle-
neck of the overall testing process. In fact, deciding whether each
test result is correct or not can be a budget-consuming activity,
especially when a (possibly large) number of tests is automatically
executed.
During the TAS3 [1] project, we performed an experiment that
aimed at evaluating the impact of test activities inside the develop-
ment of a commercial access control system. We found that
automatic test requests generation and execution required only
0.02% of the overall testing time, and that the (manual) analysis
of test results took the remaining 99.98% [14]. Thus an emerg-
ing challenge is to provide applicable and efﬁcient proposals to
reduce the effort needed during the manual check of the test
outputs.
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ysis include either the development and adoption of automatic
mechanisms (usually called the test oracles), or the application of
proper strategies for test cases selection [15,16] or prioritization
[12].
To the best of our knowledge, in the context of access control
systems the only available proposal to automatically check
whether the test outputs are correct, is provided in [17]. This work
proposes to simultaneously observe the responses from different
PDPs on the same test inputs, so that different responses can high-
light possible issues. Although effective, the proposal is quite
demanding, because it requires using different PDP implementa-
tions. The cost and effort necessary for the approach may prevent
its applicability in a commercial settings.
In test case selection, the aim is to reduce the cardinality of the
test suites while keeping the same effectiveness in terms of cover-
age or fault detection rate; in test case prioritization, the aim is to
order the test cases so that those having the highest priority can be
executed ﬁrst. In this paper, we take the latter direction by
performing XACML requests prioritization.
In our previously mentioned experiment [14], we learned sev-
eral lessons for improving the test suite effectiveness and reducing
the cost of verdict analysis. First, it is evident that only those
requests that are applicable to a policy (namely those that contain
values matching the target of the policy set, the target of the policy
and the target of the rule) will trigger the rule decision and hence
facilitate the identiﬁcation of possible access problems related to
the policy. This evidence has been used for the ad hoc selection
of the test cases. Then, the execution of such selected test cases
and the analysis of the obtained results highlighted that: (i) the
effectiveness of the reduced test suites in terms of verdict coverage
was preserved; (ii) the cardinality of the reduced test suites for
some policies was drastically decreased; (iii) the analysis time of
the verdicts of all reduced test suites was reduced of the 95%.
On the basis of the above experience, we reached the conclusion
that only speciﬁc test case selection criteria taking into account the
policy values and the request applicability to the XACML policy,
represent feasible and effective solutions for testing access control
systems.
In this paper we employ this lesson, learned in the context of
XACML test case selection, for prioritization and present an
approach, implemented into the SIMTAC tool, taking into account
the applicability of the request to the policy. More speciﬁcally we
propose an XACML test case prioritization approach based on sim-
ilarity, using two different metrics: (i) a standard similarity metric
applied to XACML test suites (we call it simple similarity), and (ii) a
more speciﬁc similarity metric for the prioritization of test cases
within an XACML test suite (we call it XACML similarity). In partic-
ular the latter implements the previously mentioned recommen-
dation, by prioritizing those requests triggering the rule decision
of an XACML policy.4. Similarity metrics
Similarity is a heuristic that is used here to order access control
requests, i.e., the test cases. Previous work on model-based testing,
such as [18], has shown that dissimilar test cases bestow a higher
fault detection power than similar ones. Analogously, the experi-
ment results presented in this paper (see Section 5) show that
two dissimilar access control requests are likely to ﬁnd more
access control faults than two similar ones.
In the following, we consider a test suite of r access control
requests fR1; . . . ;Rrg. A similarity-based prioritization approach
consists of two steps. The ﬁrst step involves the deﬁnition of a dis-
tance metric d between any two access control requests Ri and Rj,where 1 6 i; j 6 r. This metric is used to evaluate the degree of
similarity between two given requests: the highest the resulting
distance, the most different the two requests. The second step is
the ordering of these r requests. To this end, we ﬁrst compute
the distance between each pair of requests. Then, a prioritization
algorithm uses the computed distances to select the most dissim-
ilar requests, resulting in a list where the ﬁrst selected requests are
the most dissimilar ones. In Sections 4.1–4.3 we introduce the sim-
ilarity distances proposed in this paper (step 1), whereas in Sec-
tion 4.4 we show the prioritization algorithm (step 2).
4.1. Distance metrics between access control requests
We present two methods for calculating a distance metric d
between any two access control requests. The former, called the
simple similarity, is based on the lexical distance of the requests
parameters (subject, resource, action, environment). In this case
the distance dss can be generally deﬁned as follows:
dss :
R R ! f0;1;2;3;4g
ðRi;RjÞ # dssðRi;RjÞ
:
The latter, called the XACML similarity, takes into account the
requests attributes values (as the simple similarity) and the XACML
policy. The idea is to go through all levels of a policy, from the pol-
icy set target to the rules targets, and compare the request attri-
butes values with the targets values at each level.
The comparison between an XACML request and an XACML pol-
icy is performed following a relation called here Applicability. Spe-
ciﬁcally, if the request matches a target at some level (policy set,
policy or rule), then it is considered to be applicable.
For the XACML similarity, the distance dxs between requests is
policy-dependent and can be generally deﬁned as follows:
dxs :
R R XP ! Rþ
ðRi;Rj;XPkÞ # dxsðRi;Rj;XPkÞ
:
For both simple similarity and XACML similarity, we adopt the
convention that the higher is the resulting distance value, the more
dissimilar are the two requests, with a distance value equal to 0
meaning that two requests are identical.
Fig. 2 outlines the main steps for computing the two distance
metrics given two requests Ri and Rj belonging to a test suite of r
access control requests fR1; . . . ;Rrg.
As shown in Fig. 2 (light gray part), the simple similarity distance
dssðRi;RjÞ is derived by parsing each pair of requests ðRi;RjÞ, where
1 6 i; j 6 r, so as to extract their attributes values {subject; resource,
action and environment}.
These values are represented in Fig. 2 by the vectors called
ðVRi ;VRj Þ, where 1 6 i; j 6 r. The similarity distance dssðRi;RjÞ is
computed by comparing the vectors ðVRi ;VRj Þ and counting the
number of attributes having different values in the two vectors.
As an example we consider the attribute values of a set of six
requests R1;R2; . . . ;R6 obtained by the application of the Simple
Combinatorial Strategy described in Section 2.2 to the policy of
Listing 1.
 R1 ¼ fStudent;Book;Buy;nullg,
 R2 ¼ fProfessor;Book;Borrow;nullg,
 R3 ¼ fStudent;Book;Return;nullg,
 R4 ¼ fProfessor;Book;Return;nullg,
 R5 ¼ fProfessor;Book;Buy;nullg,
 R6 ¼ fStudent;Book;Borrow;nullg.
For instance, dssðR1;R3Þ ¼ 1 and dssðR3;R6Þ ¼ 1 since only the
action attribute is different in the two requests, while
dssðR1;R2Þ ¼ 2 since both the subject and the action differ in R1
Fig. 2. Main steps for computing similarity metrics.
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vided in Section 4.2.
The XACML similarity distance dxsðRi;Rj;XPÞ, of each couple of
requests fRi;Rjg, where 1 6 i; j 6 r, is a policy-dependent measure
that uses three different values: (i) the simple similarity distance
dssðRi;RjÞ; (ii) the Applicability value of the couple ðRi;RjÞ to the
policy XP; and (iii) the value of a priority relation of Ri and Rj.
The computation of the Applicability value of a couple ðRi;RjÞ to
the policy XP includes two steps:
1. the derivation of the applicability degrees of each request to the
XACML policy;
2. the summing up of the applicability degrees of the couple
ðRi;RjÞ.
Precisely, for each request Ri, where 1 6 i 6 r, ﬁve degrees of
applicability are considered: rule applicability (ruad): for each rule
of the policy, it represents the degree to which the request can sat-
isfy ﬁrst the targets of the policy sets and the policy which the rule
belongs to, and then the target of the rule itself; subject applicability
(sad) [resource applicability (rad), action applicability (aad), environ-
ment applicability (ead) respectively]: it represents the degree to
which the subject [resource, action, environment] of the request
can match ﬁrst the subjects [resources, actions, environments] of
the targets of the policy sets and the target of the policy which
the rule belongs to, and then the target of the rule itself.
For instance, considering the XACML request R3 and the rule
Rule1 of Listing 1 (line 33–67), the ﬁve applicability degrees of R3
to the rule Rule1 are as follows:
ðruad; sad; rad; aad; eadÞ ¼ 1;1;1;1
2
;0
 
Speciﬁcally, the ruad value is 1 because the request R3 exactly
matches the target of the policy set, that of the policy and that of
the rule Rule1; sad is 1 because the subject of R3, i.e., Student
exactly matches the subject of the target of the policy set, that of
the policy and that of the rule Rule1; similarly rad is 1 because
the resource of R3, i.e., Book exactly matches the resource of the
target of the policy set, that of the policy and that of the rule
Rule1; aad is 12 since the action of R3, i.e., Return matches only
one of the two actions of the target of the rule Rule1, i.e., Borrowand Return and the target of the policy set and that of the policy
do not contain action values. Finally, ead is 0 since R3 does not
specify any environment value.
As shown in Fig. 2 (dark gray part), for each request Ri, the ﬁrst
step of the computation of the applicability values provides a 5 n
matrix (where n is the cardinality of the XACML policy rules),
Applicability Matrix, of the request Ri ðAMRi Þ. Each column h of
the matrix AMRi contains the ruad, sad, rad, aad, ead values that
refer to the h-th rule of the policy P.
For instance the applicability matrix of the request R3 to the
rules of the policy of Listing 1 is:
AMR3 ¼
1:0 23
1:0 1:0
1:0 1:0
1
2 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666664
3
7777775
where the ﬁrst column is the applicability vector of R3 to rule Rule1
described above, whereas the second one is the applicability vector
of R3 to rule Rule2.
Similarly, the applicability matrix of the request R6 to the rules
of the same policy is:
AMR6 ¼
1:0 23
1:0 1:0
1:0 1:0
1
2 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666664
3
7777775
The second step in the computation of the Applicability value
consists in summing up the applicability degrees of each couple
of matrices ðAMRi ;AMRj Þ, where 1 6 i; j 6 r. In Fig. 2 the result of
this sum is called appValueðRi;RjÞ.
For instance the applicability value of ðAMR3 ;AMR6 Þ is
6.17 + 6.17 = 12.34 where 6.17 and 6.17 are the sum of all the val-
ues of AMR3 and AMR6 , respectively.
The third value used in the computation of the XACML similar-
ity distance dxsðRi;Rj;XPÞ is represented by the priority of each pair
of access control requests. The priority value for the couple ðRi;RjÞ
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XACML policy and can be equal to 3, 2, 1, 0. This priority value will
be equal to: 3 when both requests are applicable to at least a rule, 0
when both requests are not applicable to any rule. The aim is to
give higher priority to those couples of requests able to trigger
the Effect (Permit or Deny) of the rules.
As in Fig. 2, the computation of the priority value (called
priorityðRi;RjÞ) is performed by analyzing each couple of matrices
ðAMRi ;AMRj Þ. For instance, considering the above presented matri-
ces AMR3 and AMR6 , the priority value associated to the pair of
requests ðR3;R6Þ is 3 since both requests are applicable to the rule
Rule1.
The XACML similarity distance dxsðRi;Rj;XPÞ is ﬁnally computed
by summing the three obtained values ðdssðRi;RjÞ; appValue
ðRi;RjÞ; priorityðRi;RjÞÞ.
For instance the XACML similarity distance between the
requests R3 and R6 is 1 + 12.34 + 3 = 16.34 where 1 is the simple
similarity distance between R3 and R6, 12.34 is the applicability
value and 3 is the priority value computed as before.
In the following sections details about the computation of the
two distance measures are provided.
4.2. Simple similarity
Given two requests ðRi;RjÞ, the simple similarity dssðRi;RjÞ
is deﬁned based on a comparison between the request attri-
butes values. There are four attributes in each request:
{subject; action; resource and environment}. For each attribute, the
simple similarity compares the values in the two requests ðRi;RjÞ.
The distance increases each time a given attribute has different
values in the two requests. Since the evaluation is based on four
attributes, the ﬁnal distance varies between 0 and 4. Formally,
the simple similarity is deﬁned as follows:
dssðRi;RjÞ ¼
X4
k¼1
dkattributeðRi;RjÞ
where
dkattributeðRi;RjÞ ¼
1 Ri:attribute½k – Rj:attribute½k
0 otherwise

The similarity distance values relative to a set of requests
fR1; . . . ;Rrg are represented by a r  r matrix, called the Simple
Similarity Matrix (SSM)
SSM : ðR RÞ ! f0;1;2;3;4g
deﬁned as:
½SSMi;j ¼ dssðRi;RjÞ i; j ¼ 1;2; . . . ; r and i < j:
Considering the six requests R1;R2; . . . ;R6 presented in the pre-
vious section, the SSM matrix is
4.3. XACML similarity
In this section, we ﬁrst provide some deﬁnitions about the
applicability of a couple of requests to an XACML policy (Sec-
tion 4.3.1), then we present the priority relation (Section 4.3.2),and ﬁnally we formally deﬁne the XACML similarity distance
(Section 4.3.3).
4.3.1. Applicability deﬁnitions
Applicability is a relation between an XACML request and an
XACML policy. We introduce ﬁrst the Applicability Degree, which
represents the percentage of a rule that is satisﬁed by a request.
For each request the Applicability Degree values associated to the
whole set of rules are collected into a matrix called the Applicability
Matrix (Deﬁnition 1). This matrix summarizes the applicability of
the request to the XACML policy. In particular, the sum of the ele-
ments of the Applicability Matrix provides the Request Applicability
Value, which is used for assessing the requests against each other
in terms of overall applicability to the policy. Then, for each couple
of requests, we compute their Applicability Value, calculated as the
sum of their respective Request Applicability Values, which repre-
sents the overall applicability degree of a couple of requests to
the XACML policy.
As already introduced in Section 4.1, for each request Ri, where
1 6 i 6 r, ﬁve degrees of applicability are considered: rule applica-
bility (ruad); subject applicability (sad); resource applicability (rad);
action applicability (aad), environment applicability (ead). These ﬁve
values are represented into a Column Vector of length 5 called
Applicability Degree, ADRU , deﬁned as follows:
ADRU ¼
ruadRU
sadRU
radRU
aadRU
eadRU
2
666666664
3
777777775
For instance, considering the XACML request R3 and the rule
Rule1 of Listing 1 (line 33–67), the Applicability Degree of R3 to
the rule Rule1, as already explained in Section 4.1, can be shown
by the following Column Vector:
ADRURule1 ¼
1
1
1
1
2
0
2
6666664
3
7777775
To each request we associate a 5 n matrix, where n is cardi-
nality of the XACML policy rules, called Applicability Matrix of
the request RiðAMRi Þ. Each column k of the matrix AMRi contains
the ruadk; sadk, radk; aadk; eadk values that refer to the k-th rule
of the XACML policy XP.
Deﬁnition 1 (Applicability Matrix). Given a request R and a set of n
element Rules {RUi}, where i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, the Applicability Matrix
of R, called AMR, is a 5 n matrix deﬁned as:
AMR ¼ ADRU1 ADRU2 . . . ADRUn½ :
Considering the set of XACML requests introduced in Section 4.1,
{R1;R2; . . . ;R6}, and according to Deﬁnition 1, we have the follow-
ing Applicability Matrices:
AMR1 ¼
2
3
2
3
1:0 1:0
1:0 1:0
0:0 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
AMR2 ¼
1
3
1
3
0:0 0:0
1:0 1:0
0:0 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
AMR3 ¼
1:0 23
1:0 1:0
1:0 1:0
1
2 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
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1
3
1
3
0:0 0:0
1:0 1:0
0:0 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
AMR5 ¼
1
3
1
3
0:0 0:0
1:0 1:0
0:0 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
AMR6 ¼
1:0 23
1:0 1:0
1:0 1:0
1
2 0:0
0:0 0:0
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
:
Deﬁnition 2 (Request Applicability Value). Given an XACML
request R, and its 5 n Applicability Matrix AMR, the Request
Applicability Value associated to R, called RAR is deﬁned as:
RAR ¼
X5
h¼1
Xn
k¼1
½AMRh;k:Deﬁnition 3 (Applicability Value). Given a couple of requests
ðRi;RjÞ and their Request Applicability Values RARi ;RARj , the Appli-
cability Value associated to the couple of requests, called AppValue
ðRi;RjÞ is deﬁned as:
AppValueðRi;RjÞ ¼ RARi þ RARj :
Considering the XACML requests, R1 and R3, their Applicability
Matrices AMR1 ; AMR3 , and according to Deﬁnition 2, the Request
Applicability Value associated to R1 is
RAR1 ¼
X5
h¼1
X2
k¼1
½AMR1 h;k ¼ 5:33
while the Request Applicability Value associated to R3 is
RAR3 ¼
X5
h¼1
X2
k¼1
½AMR3 h;k ¼ 6:17
Hence, according to Deﬁnition 3, the Applicability Value associated
to ðR1;R3Þ is:
AppValueðR1;R3Þ ¼ RAR1 þ RAR3 ¼ 11:5:4.3.2. Priority Deﬁnition
The Priority Value (Deﬁnition 4) establishes the priority degree
of a couple of requests. This Priority Value is computed consider-
ing the combined Applicability Degree of both requests to the pol-
icy. Depending on how the respective applicabilities combine, it
can take four values (generically represented by a; b; c; d). Spe-
ciﬁcally, it yields the highest value when both requests trigger
the effect of at least a rule. This value is decreased when only
one request can trigger the effect of at least a rule, and further
if none of the two requests can trigger the effect of a rule. From
an empirical experimentation on a set of six policies described in
Section 5.1, we observed that the best values for a, b; c; d are 3,
2, 1, 0 respectively. We cannot exclude though that different val-
ues of a; b, c; d could perform better for a different set of
policies.
Deﬁnition 4 (Priority Value). Given a set of XACML requests,
{R1;R2; . . . ;Rr}, and the set of their 5 n Applicability Matrices
{AMR1 ;AMR2 ; . . . ;AMRr }, the Priority Value associated to a pair of
requests ðRi;RjÞ, where 1 6 i; j 6 r and i– j, called PriorityValue
ðRi;RjÞ
PriorityValueðRi;RjÞ : ðR RÞ ! fa; b; c; dg
is deﬁned as:PriorityValueðRi;RjÞ ¼
a if ½AMRi 1;h ¼ ½AMRj 1;k ¼ 1 9 h; k s:t: 0 6 h; k < n
b if ½AMRi 1;h ¼ 1 ^ 0 6 ½AMRj 1;k < 1 9 h s:t: 0 6 h < n;
8k s:t: 0 6 k < n
OR
0 6 ½AMRi 1;h < 1 ^ ½AMRj 1;k ¼ 1 8h s:t: 0 6 h < n;
9 k s:t: 0 6 k < n
c if 0 < ½AMRi 1;h; ½AMRj 1;k < 1 8h; k s:t: 0 6 h; k < n
d otherwise
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
According with Deﬁnition 4, the requests R1 and R3, and their
Applicability Matrices, AMR1 , AMR3 , the Priority Value associated
to the pair of requests ðR1;R3Þ is PriorityValue ðR1;R3Þ ¼ 2 since
½AMR1 1;1 ¼ ½AMR1 1;2 ¼ 23 6 1 and ½AMR3 1;1 ¼ 1.
Otherwise considering also the request R6 we have: Priority-
Value ðR3;R6Þ ¼ 3 since ½AMR3 1;1 ¼ ½AMR6 1;1 ¼ 1.
4.3.3. XACML similarity deﬁnition
In this section, we formally specify the XACML similarity (Deﬁ-
nition 5) representing the distance between a pair of requests. Spe-
ciﬁcally, given two requests ðRi;RjÞ, the XACML similarity distance
dxsðRi;RjÞ is deﬁned as the sum of the simple similarity distance, the
Applicability Value and the Priority Value associated to the pair of
requests ðRi;RjÞ.
In particular, if the two requests are identical, namely their sim-
ple similarity is equal to zero, then the XACML similarity distance is
also set to zero.
Deﬁnition 5 (XACML Similarity Distance). Given a set of XACML
requests, {R1;R2; . . . ;Rr} and an XACML Policy XP, the XACML
Similarity Distance between a pair of requests ðRi;RjÞ, where
1 6 i; j 6 r and i – j, called dxsðRi;Rj;XPÞ, is deﬁned as:
dxsðRi;Rj;XPÞ ¼
0 if dssðRi;RjÞ ¼ 0
dssðRi;RjÞþ
AppValueðRi;RjÞþ
PriorityValueðRi;RjÞ otherwise
8>><
>>:
Using Deﬁnition 5 we deﬁne the XACML Similarity Matrix
(XSM), in which the entry in the i-th row and j-th column with
i < j represents the XACML Similarity Distance between the pair
of XACML Requests Ri;Rj. Formally, given an XACML Policy XP
and given a set of XACML requests {R1;R2; . . . ;Rr}, the correspond-
ing XACML Similarity Matrix is deﬁned as:
For instance, considering the XACML policy of Listing 1 and the
set of XACML requests introduced in Section 4.1, {R1;R2; . . . ;
R6}, the corresponding XACML Similarity Matrix is the
following:
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Distance between the pair of XACML Requests ðR1;R3Þ is repre-
sented by the following element of XSM:
½XSMR1 ;R3 ¼ dxsðR1;R3;XPÞ
¼ dssðR1;R3Þ þ AppValueðR1;R3Þ þ PriorityValueðR1;R3Þ
¼ 1þ 11:5þ 2 ¼ 14:5:4.4. Ordering the access control requests
This section presents the algorithm used for the prioritization of
the requests, which can be applied to both distance metrics deﬁned
in the previous sections. The idea is to order the requests so that
the ﬁrst executed are those most dissimilar, i.e., the requests shar-
ing the highest distance. To prioritize the XACML requests we
adapt the technique proposed in [19]. The procedure steps are out-
lined in Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1. Prioritization.1: input: S ¼ fR1; . . . ;Rng, distMatrix
2: output: L . Prioritized list of n XACML requests
3: L ½
4: Select Ri;Rj where max distMatrixðRi;RjÞ
 
;1 6 i; j 6 n
5: . Take the ﬁrst ones in case of equality
6: L:addðRiÞ
7: L:addðRjÞ
8: S S n fRi;Rjg
9: while #S > 0 do
10: s sizeðLÞ
11: Select Ri 2 S where
max
Ps
j¼1distMatrixðRi; L:getðjÞ
 
;1 6 i 6 n
12: . Take the ﬁrst one in case of equality
13: L:addðRiÞ
14: S S n fRig . Remove Ri from S
15: end while
16: return L
Informally, the algorithm selects the request that is the most
distant from all the requests already selected during the previous
steps of the approach. It takes as input the set of XACML request
S ¼ fR1; . . . ;Rng and a distance matrix (distMatrix), which can
be either the SSMmatrix or the XSMmatrix deﬁned in the previous
sections. Using the distances between the requests collected into
the matrix, it ﬁrst selects the two XACML requests having the high-
est distance (Algorithm 1, line 4). In case of equality the ﬁrst pair of
requests is selected. Then these two requests are removed from the
set of XACML requests to be prioritized, i.e., the set S (Algorithm 1,
line 8). In the next step, the algorithm considers among the
remaining XACML requests the one yielding the maximum sum
of the distances from all the already selected requests (Algorithm
1, line 11). In case of equality, the ﬁrst request is selected. Then,
the selected request is removed from the XACML requests to be
prioritized (Algorithm 1, line 14). The process is repeated until
all requests are selected.
Considering for instance the SSMmatrix at the end of Section 4.2
according to Algorithm 1 (line 4), the pair ðR1;R2Þ is selected
because this is the ﬁrst pair having the maximum distance equal
to 2 ðSSMð1;2Þ ¼ 2Þ. For the remaining set of requests
fR3;R4;R5;R6g the sum of the distances between each of them
and the requests R1 and R2 is computed. Then the request havingthe maximum sum is selected (Algorithm 1, line 9–15).
Speciﬁcally:
 for R3 : SSMð1;3Þ þ SSMð2;3Þ ¼ 1þ 2 ¼ 3,
 for R4 : SSMð1;4Þ þ SSMð2;4Þ ¼ 2þ 1 ¼ 3,
 for R5 : SSMð1;5Þ þ SSMð2;5Þ ¼ 1þ 1 ¼ 2,
 for R6 : SSMð1;6Þ þ SSMð2;6Þ ¼ 1þ 1 ¼ 2.
Thus the request R3 is selected because it is the ﬁrst one having
the maximum sum (equal to 3). According to Algorithm 1 (line 9–
15), the above described steps are repeated for the set of remaining
requests. Finally, the obtained ordered set of requests is
fR1;R2;R3;R4;R5;R6g.
Applying Algorithm 1 to the XSMmatrix presented at the end of
Section 4.3.3, instead, the obtained ﬁnal ordered set of requests is
fR3;R6;R1;R2;R4;R5g.
It is worth noting that this prioritization algorithm belongs to
the category of prioritizations that do not rely on a feedback to
adjust the selection of test cases as it goes forth (they are also
called ‘‘total’’ prioritizations as opposed to the ‘‘additional’’ priori-
tizations that rely on a feedback).5. Experiments
This section presents the experimental results obtained by
applying the proposed similarity-based prioritization metrics. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we used the tool SIMTAC to evaluate the effectiveness of
the simple similarity and XACML similarity metrics when applied
to the test suites related to a set of real-world XACML policies.
We aim at evaluating the effectiveness in terms of fault detection
rate of the two similarity-based prioritization metrics, by answer-
ing to the following research questions:
RQ1: Similarity Effectiveness: can the similarity-based prioritiza-
tion techniques outperform other prioritization methods in
terms of fault detection rate? In particular, we will assess
whether the similarity-based prioritization techniques are
more effective than prioritization based on a mutation-based
heuristic, or on a random selection, or on n-wise combinatorial
approaches.
RQ2: Similarity Variability: is the effectiveness of a test suite pri-
oritized using similarity-based approaches inﬂuenced by its
size? In other words, we will assess whether the effectiveness
in terms of fault detection of a test suite prioritized using sim-
ilarity-based approaches depends on the size of the test suite.
By answering RQ1, we want to assess the effectiveness of sim-
ilarity-based prioritization techniques against: (i) a mutation-
based heuristic, which is able to optimize the fault detection rate
and therefore represents the upper bound for the comparison;
(ii) random selection, which is commonly used as baseline
approach, and (iii) n-wise combinatorial approaches, which repre-
sent a widely adopted methodology for test cases derivation.
By answering RQ2, we want to show that the effectiveness of
the proposed prioritization approaches does not depend on the size
of the initial test suite of the X-CREATE tool. This experiment has
been performed by using ten test suites of various sizes randomly
selected from the initial X-CREATE test set.
To answer the ﬁrst research question, we used the simple sim-
ilarity and the XACML similarity metrics for ordering the test suites
related to six XACML policies, and compared the effectiveness of
the prioritized test suites in terms of fault detection rate. For mea-
suring the latter, a mutation approach speciﬁcally conceived for
XACML language has been used for introducing faults in the six
XACML policies and the prioritized test suites have been run to
Table 1
Mutation operators [20].
ID Description
PSTT Policy Set Target True
PSTF Policy Set Target False
PTT Policy Target True
PTF Policy Target False
RTT Rule Target True
RTF Rule Target False
RCT Rule Condition True
RCF Rule Condition False
CPC Change Policy Combining Algorithm
CRC Change Rule Combining Algorithm
CRE Change Rule Effect
RPT (RTT) Rule Type is replaced with another one
ANR Add a New Rule
RER Remove an Existing Rule
RUF RemoveUniquenessFunction
AUF AddUniquenessFunction
CNOF Change-N-OF-Function
CLF ChangeLogicalFunction
ANF AddNotFunction
RNF RemoveNotFunction
CCF ChangeComparisonFunction
FPR First the Rules having a Permit effect
FDR First the Rules having a Deny effect
Table 2
Description of the six policies.
Policy name Rules Subjects Resources Actions Environments
ASMS 117 8 5 11 3
Itrust 64 7 46 9 0
VMS 106 7 3 15 4
Continue-a 298 16 29 4 0
LMS 42 8 3 10 3
Pluto 21 4 90 1 0
Table 3
Structure of the six policies.
Policy name ] Policy sets ] Policies
ASMS 1 1
Itrust 1 1
VMS 1 1
Continue-a 111 266
LMS 1 1
Pluto 1 1
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for deriving a set of XACMLmutants we have adopted the XACMUT
tool.3 Speciﬁcally, Table 1 lists the XACMUT mutation operators.
As said, the fault detection rate of the prioritized test suites has
been compared with the ones obtained by: a greedy-optimal selec-
tion of test cases, computed based on the mutation coverage,
which was able to maximize the fault detection rate (called muta-
tion-based heuristic); a random selection of test cases (called ran-
dom order); and the default X-CREATE requests order (see
Section 2.2), which represents per se a possible prioritization tech-
nique based on an n-wise combinatorial approach (called X-CRE-
ATE order).
To address the second research question, we repeated the pre-
viously mentioned experiment considering several test suites of
various sizes. In this experiment the test suites have been derived
by a random selection of a different subset from the available
requests set. The comparison between the different prioritized
subsets has been provided again in terms of fault detection rate.
In the rest of this section we ﬁrst provide details about the six
XACML policies and the mutation approach used for introducing
faults in them (Section 5.1). Then we describe the experiments per-
formed to reply to RQ1 (Section 5.2) and to RQ2 (Section 5.3).5.1. Policies and setup
Table 2 presents the sizes of the six XACML policies used in our
experiments in terms of the number of subjects, resources, actions
and environments in addition to the number of rules. Table 3
shows the structure of these policies in terms of policy sets and
policies. Some policies contain several policy sets and the same
rules appear in more than one policy.
With reference to this table, LMS is a Library Management Sys-
tem, VMS is a Virtual Meeting System and ASMS is an Auction Sales
Management System. LMS, VMS, and ASMS are policies from three
Java-based systems, which were used previously in several
research papers (for instance in [21]). continue-a [22] is a policy
that is used by the Continue application, a web-based conference
management tool. pluto policy is used by the ARCHON system, a3 A release of the XACMUT tool is available at http://labse.isti.cnr.it/tools/xacmut.digital library management tool [23]. Finally, itrust policy is part
of the itrust system, a health-care management system [24].
As explained previously, we have compared the effectiveness of
the proposed similarity-based prioritization metrics (namely
XACML similarity and simple similarity) with those of three other
prioritization approaches: the random order, the mutation-based
heuristic and the X-CREATE order. In particular the random order
is presented in Algorithm 2. For each randomly selected request,
we evaluated the number of killed mutants. To avoid experimental
bias, we performed the random Algorithm 10 times and computed
the average number of killed mutants on the 10 runs. We executed
the requests with the original policy ﬁrst and collected for each
request the obtained response. Then, we run these requests with
all mutated policies and collected the responses for each request.
A given request kills a given mutant when the obtained response
from the mutant is different from the original policy response.
Algorithm 2. Random Prioritization.
1: input: S ¼ fR1; . . . ;Rng . Unordered set of n XACML
requests
2: output: L . Prioritized list of n XACML
requests
3: L ½
4: while #S > 0 do
5: i randomð1;#SÞ . Choose a random integer between 0
and #S
6: L:addðRiÞ
7: S S n fRig . Remove Ri from S
8: end while
9: return L
The mutation-based heuristic is a nearly optimal algorithm
since it orders the requests according to the cumulative number
of different mutants killed by the requests. The algorithm used in
this case is similar to Prioritization Algorithm 1 (Section 4.4).
Instead of using the distance to select the test cases, it relies on
the numbers of mutants killed by each request (the mutation
results) to order the requests. Therefore, this approach requires
performing the mutation analysis by running all requests on
mutated policies to get the mutation results. Then requests are
ordered according to the numbers of killed mutants per requests.
For the sake of consistency, we decided to always follow the alpha-
betical order when handling the XACML requests. The way ﬁles are
Fig. 4. Continue-a policy.
Fig. 5. Itrust policy.
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the underlying platform (windows, Linux, etc.). In order to avoid
any issue that could occur when running our Java tool on Linux
based systems, Windows or MAC OS, we order ﬁles alphabetically
before handling them.
Finally, the last prioritization approach that we consider is the
default X-CREATE order. We consider the order in which the
requests are generated by the X-CREATE tool, considered as a pri-
oritization approach. This allows for evaluating the effectiveness of
our approach compared to the default order of generation of
requests.
5.2. Similarity effectiveness evaluation
In this section we discuss the results of the experiment per-
formed to reply to RQ1 (see Figs. 3–8)
The results are depicted in a separate plot for each policy in the
next six ﬁgures. The plots illustrate the cumulative number of
mutants killed by each prioritized request set. They show the effec-
tiveness of each approach, especially how effective are the ﬁrst
requests in improving the overall number of mutants killed. For
instance, we can consider the ﬁrst 200 requests and compare the
number of mutants killed by each prioritized request set. After run-
ning the ﬁrst 200 requests (out of the 1400 requests that are gen-
erated) for the continue-a policy, we can clearly see that the
requests obtained from the XACML similarity prioritization are
killing almost 1200 mutants (out of the 1800 mutants), which rep-
resents 66% of mutation score, while the other three approaches
(X-CREATE, simple similarity and random prioritization) enable
killing 800, which represents about 44% of mutation score.
The results that we obtained for the six policies allow us to eval-
uate how effective are the ﬁrst tests. Speciﬁcally, the results pre-
sented in Table 4 show that: 10% of the XACML similarity-based
prioritized test suite guarantees at least 50% of mutation score
for 5 of the six policies (for pluto, it reaches 21%); 20% of the
XACML similarity-based prioritized test suite guarantees at least
60% of the mutation score for 5 of the six policies (for pluto, it
reaches 41%); 30% of the XACML similarity-based prioritized test
suite guarantees at least 85% of the mutation score for 4 of the
six policies (it reaches around 60% for pluto and itrust). It is out
of the scope of the paper to provide a general criterion to select
the best subset of the overall prioritized test suite. However, from
the analysis of the above results, 20% of the test suite seems to be a
good cutoff point. More detailed results are included in the addi-
tional material document, which show the numbers of mutantsFig. 3. ASMS policy.
Fig. 6. LMS policy.killed by ﬁrst 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% of the pri-
oritized test suites for all the presented prioritization criteria and
policies.
Fig. 7. Pluto policy.
Fig. 8. VMS policy.
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approaches we also computed the APFD metric that is commonly
used in prioritization research. It is deﬁned as follows [25]:APFD ¼
Pn1
i¼1 Fi
n l þ
1
2nwhere n is the number of test cases in the test suite T, l is the num-
ber of faults, and Fi is the number of faults detected by at least one
test case among the ﬁrst i test cases in T. The results in Table 5 show
the APFD value of each proposed criterion for each of the six policies
and conﬁrm that the XACML Similarity approach outperforms the
other approaches (except the mutation-based one).
To sum up, we can notice from the results that for all the poli-
cies the best results are, as expected, obtained from the mutation-
based prioritization. Among the remaining prioritization
approaches, there are three approaches leading to almost similar
results; the random, the X-CREATE and the simple similarity. The
plots also show that the XACML similarity outperforms these three
techniques. This result is obtained for all the six policies.
From these obtained results, we can draw the following
conclusions: Effectiveness of the XACML similarity approach: We can notice
clearly that for all policies the XACML similarity provides
always better results and is close to the nearly optimal solution
(the mutation-based prioritization results). This indicates that
taking into account the policy is very useful when it comes to
test prioritization.
 Lack of effectiveness of the simple similarity: The obtained
results show clearly that the simple similarity is providing poor
prioritization results. Ignoring the policy and relying only on the
requests content to perform similarity prioritization leads to
poor results that are comparable to the random prioritization
results.
 X-CREATE results are similar to random prioritization results:
Interestingly, the six policies results demonstrate that the
default order in which the X-CREATE tool creates the requests
is providing a mutation-killing capability similar to the random
one. This result is important because it shows clearly that we
need to apply other prioritization approaches (like similarity)
because the default order in which requests are created leads
to poor results.
As a summary, the experiments that we conducted clearly rec-
ommend the use of the XACML similarity approach. It showed to
be very effective for all the six policies that we used and outper-
formed the other prioritization approaches. In addition, the exper-
iments conﬁrm the need to use prioritization because the default
order (the X-CREATE prioritization) is providing poor fault detec-
tion rate.
5.3. Inﬂuence of test-suite size
In this section we discuss the results of the experiment per-
formed to reply to RQ2. We assess whether the effectiveness, mea-
sured in terms of fault detection rate of the prioritized test suites,
depends on the size of the test suite. In the previous section, we
showed that all the studied prioritization approaches, except of
the XACML similarity, did not provide good mutation results when
compared to the mutation-based prioritization. Therefore, here we
only consider the XACML similarity.
For each of the six XACML policies of Section 5.1, different test
suites of various sizes were selected at random from the set of
requests (called here initial test population) generated by the X-
CREATE tool. In particular, ten sets of size ratios 10%, 20%, 30%,
40%, 50%, 60%, 70% and 80% of the initial test population were
selected per each considered policy. For each selected set, the pro-
posed XACML similarity approach and the random order were
applied. We record the APFD values for each policy and repetition
of the experiment. Thus, a total of 60 values (6 policies  10 inde-
pendent repetitions) per examined size were collected.
Fig. 9 shows the obtained results as box plots per selected size.
Generally, the box plot representation graphically represents the
distribution of the collected values. The area within the boxes rep-
resents the data that have values higher than the 25% and lower
than the 75% of all the population data values. The horizontal line
inside the box represents the median value. In Fig. 9 the two boxes
of each graph represent the results of the XACML similarity. Each
one of the graphs corresponds to the examined test suite sizes.
Thus, the results evidence that XACML similarity kills a higher
number of mutants than the random order. So, in reply to RQ2,
we can conclude that the XACML similarity is not affected by the
size of the prioritized test sets.
To investigate further RQ2 we formally compared the XACML
similarity and the random approach, using the Mann–Whitney U
test. This is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test that allows
for comparing two samples without making assumptions about the
distribution of the underlying population. We test the hypothesis
Table 4
Mutant-kill ratios achieved by ordered sub-sets of X-CREATE requests.
Row Policy %R %M %R %M %R %M %R %M %R %M %R %M %R %M %R %M %R %M
1 ASMS
2 XACML requests Killed mutants
3 1760 6649
4 Mutation-based 10 80 20 92 30 98 40 100 50 100 60 100 70 100 80 100 90 100
5 XACML similarity 10 76 20 83 30 89 40 94 50 96 60 97 70 98 80 99 90 99
6 Simple similarity 10 26 20 44 30 56 40 65 50 72 60 80 70 84 80 90 90 95
7 X-CREATE 10 33 20 47 30 63 40 76 50 79 60 87 70 89 80 92 90 96
8 Random 10 26 20 43 30 55 40 65 50 74 60 80 70 86 80 92 90 93
9 Policy Continue-a
10 XACML requests Killed mutants
11 1392 1741
12 Mutation-based 10 94 20 100 30 100 40 100 50 100 60 100 70 100 80 100 90 100
13 XACML similarity 10 53 20 73 30 85 40 93 50 99 60 99 70 99 80 99 90 100
14 Simple similarity 10 41 20 52 30 63 40 71 50 78 60 84 70 88 80 92 90 95
15 X-CREATE 10 34 20 51 30 58 40 59 50 65 60 72 70 79 80 88 90 94
16 Random 10 40 20 51 30 60 40 69 50 75 60 82 70 88 80 93 90 96
17 Policy Itrust
18 XACML requests Killed mutants
19 2835 11949
20 Mutation-based 10 52 20 62 30 66 40 71 50 76 60 81 70 85 80 90 90 95
21 XACML similarity 10 50 20 60 30 65 40 71 50 75 60 80 70 85 80 90 90 95
22 Simple similarity 10 26 20 41 30 51 40 59 50 68 60 76 70 83 80 88 90 94
23 X-CREATE 10 27 20 40 30 49 40 56 50 64 60 72 70 80 80 86 90 93
24 Random 10 23 20 37 30 48 40 58 50 66 60 74 70 81 80 88 90 94
25 Policy LMS
26 XACML requests Killed mutants
27 720 2183
28 Mutation-based 10 77 20 90 30 98 40 100 50 100 60 100 70 100 80 100 90 100
29 XACML similarity 10 73 20 86 30 91 40 94 50 97 60 98 70 99 80 99 90 99
30 Simple similarity 10 28 20 46 30 57 40 70 50 79 60 82 70 85 80 91 90 96
31 X-CREATE 10 33 20 48 30 60 40 74 50 80 60 86 70 88 80 92 90 96
32 Random 10 30 20 47 30 60 40 70 50 78 60 84 70 89 80 94 90 97
33 Policy Pluto
34 XACML requests Killed mutants
35 360 14721
36 Mutation-based 10 23 20 42 30 61 40 79 50 96 60 97 70 98 80 99 90 99
37 XACML similarity 10 21 20 41 30 61 40 79 50 95 60 96 70 97 80 98 90 99
38 Simple similarity 10 14 20 27 30 39 40 49 50 59 60 68 70 77 80 85 90 93
39 X-CREATE 10 17 20 29 30 38 40 48 50 58 60 67 70 76 80 84 90 92
40 Random 10 15 20 27 30 38 40 48 50 58 60 67 70 76 80 84 90 92
41 Policy VMS
42 XACML requests Killed mutants
43 945 5550
44 Mutation-based 10 67 20 87 30 93 40 98 50 100 60 100 70 100 80 100 90 100
45 XACML similarity 10 65 20 80 30 85 40 89 50 93 60 97 70 98 80 99 90 99
46 Simple similarity 10 18 20 28 30 41 40 53 50 63 60 71 70 79 80 87 90 95
47 X-CREATE 10 17 20 29 30 38 40 48 50 58 60 67 70 76 80 84 90 92
48 Random 10 19 20 34 30 44 40 52 50 63 60 70 70 77 80 83 90 91
Table 5
APFD values for the six policies.
Policy name Mutation-based XACML similarity Simple similarity X-CREATE Random
ASMS 0.933 0.895 0.673 0.718 0.676
Itrust 0.748 0.742 0.645 0.626 0.627
VMS 0.904 0.864 0.594 0.591 0.657
Continue-a 0.962 0.856 0.728 0.659 0.715
LMS 0.923 0.902 0.695 0.716 0.708
pluto 0.747 0.741 0.565 0.563 0.558
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similarity (MSSim) is higher than the mutation score achieved by
the test cases of the random order (MSRand). Thus, we test the fol-
lowing hypothesis (MSSim > MSRand) with the conﬁdence level 95%.Given a set of test cases of size n, the hypothesis test involves n
comparisons of the mutation scores of the twomethods (prioritiza-
tion and random order). Since the random order involved ten dif-
ferent orderings, we compare the prioritization technique against
(a) 10% of the test suite size (b) 20% of the test suite size
(c) 30% of the test suite size (d) 40% of the test suite size
(e) 50% of the test suite size (f) 60% of the test suite size
(g) 70% of the test suite size (h) 80% of the test suite size
Fig. 9. APFD values for the different test set sizes.
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tical analysis we can identify the following four cases:
True with signiﬁcance (TS): the prioritization method kills
statistically signiﬁcantly more
mutants than the random
ordering.
True without signiﬁcance (TNS): the prioritization method kills
more mutants than the ran-
dom ordering but without sta-
tistical signiﬁcance.
False without signiﬁcance (FNS): the prioritization method kills
less mutants than the random
ordering but without statisti-
cal signiﬁcance.
False with signiﬁcance (FS): the prioritization method kills
statistically signiﬁcantly less
mutants than the random
ordering.
Following these lines, we conduct 60 statistical tests (ten
repetitions per subject policy for the six considered policies) per
considered set size (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70% and 80% of
thewhole test suite). The respective results are recorded on Table 6.
The results show that the XACML similarity approach performs sig-
niﬁcantly better than the random orderings in all the cases. This
fact signiﬁes the ability of the proposed approach to effectively
prioritize the test sets even of a small size.6. Threats to validity
This section discusses threats to the internal, external and con-
struct validity of the experiments presented in this paper. Concern-
ing the internal validity, i.e., the amount of conﬁdence on the
reported results, different aspects can be considered: the used
mutation operators, the employed test set, the correctness of the
implementation and the tools used.
Since the effectiveness of the approach is evaluated in term of
fault detection rate, the set of utilized mutation operators may
inﬂuence the reported results. It could be that a different choice
of mutation operators might have provided different effectiveness
results. To reduce this risk, the present study employs a combina-
tion of three different mutant sets: ﬁrst, the set of mutants used in
[26] (this set was adapted to XACML policies); second, the opera-
tors from Martin and Xie [27]; third, some new operators based
on our most recent work [20]. However, it would be very interest-
ing to investigate other mutants and even real faults to provide
conﬁdence in the proposed approach and reduce the threat related
to the use of mutation analysis.
Another threat to our proposal is due to the employed test sets.
We used those derived by X-CREATE, but it is likely that other test
sets may produce different results. However, X-CREATE represents
the current state of the art in XACML test generation tools. ItTable 6
Hypothesis tests for the similarity prioritization and the random orderings.
MSSim > MSRand (%) TS TNS FNS FS
10 43 17 0 0
20 51 9 0 0
30 60 0 0 0
40 60 0 0 0
50 60 0 0 0
60 60 0 0 0
70 60 0 0 0
80 60 0 0 0employs combinatorial interaction testing, which is a well-estab-
lished test technique in various domains.
Other threats may be attributed to the implementations of the
SIMTAC tool, the XACMUT mutation tool and the X-CREATE test
generation tool. These tools may have ﬂaws, the presence of which
may inﬂuence the reported results. To reduce these threats, several
manual tests were performed. Additionally, at least two authors
independently tested all the implemented parts.
External validity of the experiment concerns potential issues
that may prevent the generalization of the results. While this is
an issue concerning all empirical studies, including ours, to the
authors’ knowledge, the present study forms one of the largest
studies conducted on XACML testing. Additionally, the six policies
have quite different structures. Some have few rules whereas other
ones have a large number of rules. In some cases, the number of
resources is much bigger than the number of subjects and actions
(this is the case for itrust and pluto policies) while in other cases it
is the opposite (for VMS policy). Since similar results (our approach
performs much better than random) are observed on all the cases,
some conﬁdence that our approach will behave similarly on other
subjects is provided.
With respect to construct validity, i.e., threats regarding the
extent of the utilized measures to the intended properties, some
potential issues can also be identiﬁed. One such issue is the use
of mutants as a means of effectiveness evaluation. While this is a
potential problem of the conducted experiment, in practice evalu-
ating one criterion in terms of another one is a usual practice, e.g.,
[28]. Since the similarity approach is independent from the
employed mutants, this threat should be balanced. Moreover,
using mutants for effectiveness evaluation forms a common prac-
tice in this kind of experiments, e.g., [29,30].7. Related work
This work spans over several research directions, including:
test case prioritization, access control testing and similarity
approaches.
Test case prioritization. Test case prioritization relies on test
cases re-ordering techniques to improve the fault detection rate
at a given test execution time [22]. In [9], the authors have
assessed the fault detection rate of JUnit and TSL test suites on
open-source Java systems through mutation faults. This rate is
impacted by mutation faults number and by test suites effective-
ness to detect faults.
In [31], the authors have conducted a series of controlled exper-
iments to evaluate test case prioritization techniques based on
time constraints and fault detection rate. Their results favor the
application of heuristics when the software contains considerable
faults number and when the testing process has no time
constraints. In [8,32], the authors have conducted experimental
studies to show the effectiveness of prioritization techniques to
improve fault detection rate in the context of regression testing.
Our approach does not address regression testing, although it
could be adapted to be applicable in a regression testing context
when the access control policy evolves [33].
While most of the prioritization techniques in the literature rely
on code coverage [34–36], some recent approaches have adopted
different metrics. In [37], the authors use system models and sys-
tem behavior to prioritize test cases. They have compared their
approach with other prioritization techniques and have shown
its effectiveness in early fault detection. The authors in [38] have
used expert knowledge to achieve pair-wise comparison of test
cases and have proposed similarity metrics, like we have done in
the current work, between test cases clusters. Finally, the work
in [12] improves the similarity-based test case prioritization using
370 A. Bertolino et al. / Information and Software Technology 58 (2015) 355–372the ordered sequence of program elements measured by execution
counts. The authors show that the proposed technique increases
the rate of fault detection with respect to other coverage-based
approaches.
Testing Access Control Systems. Testing Access Control Systems is
a critical issue and the complexity of the XACML language speciﬁ-
cation prevents the manual speciﬁcation of a set of test cases capa-
ble of covering all the possible interesting critical situations or
faults. This implies the need of automated test cases generation
for testing on the one side the XACML policy speciﬁcation and on
the other that the PDP behavior conforms to the policy
speciﬁcation.
Among the available proposals, the Targen tool [4] generates
test inputs using combinatorial coverage of the truth values of
independent clauses of XACML policy values. This approach has
been proven to be more effective than random generation strategy
in terms of structural coverage of the policy and fault detection
rate [4].
A more recent tool is X-CREATE [13,5,14] that provides different
strategies based on combinatorial approaches of the subject,
resource, action and environment values taken from the XACML
policy for deriving the access requests. Experimental results pre-
sented in [13] show that the fault detection rate of X-CREATE test
suites is similar or higher than that of Targen test suites. Speciﬁ-
cally, three main generation strategies are deﬁned into X-CREATE:
(i) the Simple Combinatorial testing strategy [5] that derives an
XACML request for each of the possible combinations of the sub-
ject, resource, action and environment values taken from the pol-
icy; (ii) the XPT-based testing strategy [13,5] that generates
requests using the structures obtained applying the XPT strategy
[39] to the XACML Context Schema [3]; (iii) the Multiple Combina-
torial strategy that relies on combinations of more than one sub-
ject, resource, action and environment values for generating
XACML requests. This last strategy automatically establishes the
number of subjects, resources, actions and environments of each
request according to the complexity of the policy structure and tar-
gets the policy rules in which the effect is simultaneously depen-
dent on more than one constraint [14]. A detailed comparison of
X-CREATE test generation strategies in terms of fault detection is
presented in [5,14]. Among the X-CREATE generation strategies
we selected in this paper Simple Combinatorial for deriving test
suites used to empirically validate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed approach. This strategy is simple and easy-to-apply while
at the same time it can reach the coverage of the policy values
combinations. More detail about this strategy are presented in
Section 2.2.
The work in [21] addresses model-based testing and provides a
methodology for the generation of test cases based on combinato-
rial approaches of the elements of the model (role names, permis-
sion names, context names). Such approach automatically derives
abstract test cases that have to be then reﬁned into concrete
XACML requests for being executed on a PDP.
Concerning the testing of the XACML PDP, the approach pro-
posed in [17] focuses on running different XACML implementa-
tions for the same test inputs and can detect not correctly
implemented XACML functionalities when different outputs are
observed.
In software testing, mutation analysis [40] is commonly used to
assess the effectiveness of a test suite. It consists of introducing
single faults in a given program and running tests to assess their
capability to detect these faults. Mutation analysis has been
applied on access control policies [27,26,20] to qualify security
tests. By means of mutation operators, the policy under test is
modiﬁed to derive a set of faulty policies (mutants) each contain-
ing a fault. A mutant policy is killed if the response of an XACML
request executed on the mutant policy differs from the responseof the same request executed on the original policy. In [27] the
authors deﬁne a fault model for access control policies and a set
of mutation operators manipulating the predicates and logical con-
structs of target and condition elements of an XACML policy. They
have used mutation analysis applied on access control policies to
assess coverage criteria for test generation and test selection in
terms of fault detection rate. In [26] the authors try to extend
the mutation operators of [27], focusing on the use of a metamodel
that allows to simulate the faults in the security models indepen-
dently from the used role-based formalism (R-BAC or OrBAC).
Finally, the work in [20] includes and enhances the mutation
operators of [27,26] addressing speciﬁc faults of the XACML 2.0
language and providing a tool, called XACMUT, for the derivation
of XACML mutation operators and their application to XACML
policies. In this paper, the XACMUT tool has been adopted for
deriving from an XACML policy a set of mutants used to assess
the effectiveness of the proposed similarity-based prioritization
approaches.
Similarity approaches. Similarity has been used in previous work
for XACML-based policies comparison. In [41,42], the authors have
deﬁned similarity distances to enable comparing access control
policies in order to locate providers that have similar policies in
large scale environments like cloud systems. The number of poli-
cies that have to be evaluated at a given time can be reduced under
the assumption that similar policies might provide the same deci-
sions. Therefore they focus on comparing policies and do not com-
pare requests as done in this current work. In fact, to the best of our
knowledge, similarity has not yet been applied in the context of
XACML policies testing. This heuristic has mainly been applied
in the context of model-based testing. For instance, Cartaxo et al.
[43] presented a strategy for automatic test case selection
based on the use of a similarity function. Labeled transition sys-
tems are the model from which test cases are obtained. The simi-
larity function f used is calculated by observing the number of
identical transitions and the average between paths length. They,
then use a greedy approach to select the test cases. On the same
direction, Hemmati et al. [18,15] investigated and compared
possible similarity functions that can be used for test cases
selection in the context of state machine testing. The selection
strategy used is based on genetic algorithms. Test cases are
encoded using UML state machines with states, transitions and
triggers/guards.
Similarity has also been used to cluster test cases. Sapna and
Mohanty [44] used the Levenshtein distance to compare test
cases and agglomerate hierarchical clustering in order to select
dissimilar test scenarios with maximum coverage and fault
detection rate. UML activity diagrams are the model used from
which test cases are obtained. In this work, we use similarity also
for improving the fault detection rate of the selected subset of
requests.
Finally, in [19,45], similarity is used to generate and prioritize
test suites in the context of Software Product Lines. In these works,
similarity was evaluated in terms of (a) covering t-wise interac-
tions [19] and (b) killing mutants related to the product line repre-
sentation, i.e., feature models [45]. In our work, similarity is used to
distinguish redundant test cases and prioritize them. In line with
our work, Henard et al. [45] uses mutation to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the selected test suite. Additionally, in [19] the authors
introduce a prioritization technique, called Global Maximum Dis-
tance [19], which is also used in this paper (the mutation-based
strategy).
In our work, we are targeting a completely different and new
context, which is XACML policies testing and we rely on similar-
ity to prioritize XACML requests. All these previous work are
however using the same heuristic and applying it to other
contexts.
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In this paper, we presented a new approach based on similarity,
and implemented into the SIMTAC tool, aiming at prioritizing tests
in the context of XACML access control systems. We proposed two
similarity-based prioritization metrics: the ﬁrst strategy is the sim-
ple similarity, which is policy-independent and involves compar-
ing the content of requests; the second approach is called XACML
similarity and considers the applicability of the requests to the
XACML policy. We performed an empirical study to evaluate the
effectiveness of the simple and the XACML similarity metrics when
applied to the test suites related to a set of six real-world XACML
policies. The results showed that the second approach is effective
and provides a mutation coverage that is signiﬁcantly better than
random prioritization and close to a greedy-optimal heuristic cog-
nizant of the requests effectiveness.
In future work, we plan to investigate several other issues
related to the proposed approach. In particular, we want to reﬁne
the proposed applicability relation taking into account further ele-
ments of the XACML policy such as the condition or the combining
algorithm. Indeed this last plays an important role in case of poli-
cies with conﬂicting rules. Moreover, we plan to extend the simi-
larity-based prioritization metrics in order to consider other test
case generation strategies, also based on the combination of more
than one subject, resource, action, environment.
Future work will also include further experimentation consider-
ing more XACML policies and the application of the SIMTAC tool to
evaluate the effectiveness of the similarity-based prioritization
metrics applied to different test suites.Acknowledgment
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